Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements by Gormley, Aine et al.
D23.2
Improving the resilience 
of water distribution agreements
AINE GORMLEY
PAUL JEFFREY
ZORAN KAPELAN
RITA HOCHSTRAT
 Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements 
 
 
TRUST report  
Deliverable 23.2 
 
Authors 
Aine Gormley (Cranfield University) 
Paul Jeffrey (Cranfield University) 
Zoran Kapelan (University of Exeter) 
Rita Hochstrat (FHNW) 
 
Reviewers 
Chris Büscher, KWR Watercycle Research Institute  
Dominik Nottarp-Heim, IWW Water Centre 
 
 
March 2015 
 
 
 
 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 265122. 
This publication reflects only the authors' views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made 
of the information contained therein.   
www.trust-i.net - info@trust-i.net                    Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements  D23.2       -1- 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS  
List of tables ................................................................................................................... 3 
List of figures .................................................................................................................. 3 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 4 
2. Dynamics between the stability of water governance arrangements and the 
considerations that determine how water is allocated .................................................... 5 
2.1. Water governance arrangements ......................................................................................... 5 
2.2. Changes to water governance arrangements .................................................................... 9 
2.3. The procedural and distributional justice considerations that determine how water 
is allocated ........................................................................................................................................ 12 
2.4. Dynamics between the stability of water governance arrangements and how water 
is allocated ........................................................................................................................................ 15 
3. Comparison of water allocation procedures in a water sparse and a water abundant 
country ......................................................................................................................... 18 
4. How features of water governance systems relate to adaptive management theory
 23 
4.1. Adaptive management theory ............................................................................................ 23 
4.2. Relationship to the stability of water governance arrangements and distribution 
criteria.................................................................................................. ¡Error! Marcador no definido. 
5. Strengths and weaknesses of governance models ................................................ 27 
6. Can water governance arrangement be made fit for purpose? .............................. 32 
7. Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 35 
References ................................................................................................................... 36 
 
  
www.trust-i.net - info@trust-i.net                    Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements  D23.2       -2- 
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Examples of water sector governance reforms relating to the characteristics of 
agency (Bakker, 2014) ..................................................................................................... 11 
Table 2: Associations between the factors that affect the stability of water governance 
arrangements (row headings) and water allocation criteria (column headings). 16 
Table 3: General analysis (from the perspective of European water service providers) of the 
relative strength of associations between the influencers (or drivers) of dynamics 
in Table 2, showing high (red), medium (orange) and low (yellow). ...................... 17 
Table 4: Comparison of water allocation mechanisms and outcomes in two countries with 
varying degrees of water availability and water governance systems. ................ 21 
Table 5: Descriptions of the various water rights that are conferred as a result of water 
allocation procedures (Table 4). These describe the extent of the use and control 
rights conferred to the user. Note that their nature (licenses, permits, access) 
varies in different jurisdictions (WWF, 2007). ............................................................ 22 
Table 6. How the most prominent features of water governance systems (Table 4) work 
together – or misalign with relevant characteristics of adaptive management 
theory ................................................................................................................................ 26 
Table 7. Strengths and weaknesses of various water governance models. ............................... 29 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Changing water governance arrangements lead to changing outcomes and 
resources (Franks et al., 2013, p.7). ................................................................................ 5 
Figure 2. Conceptions of modes of governance (Treib et al., 2005, p.7). ...................................... 6 
Figure 3. Centralisation-decentralisation continuum (modified from Malone, 1997, Figure 3). . 7 
Figure 4. Global areas of physical and economic water scarcity (Comprehensive Assessment 
of Water Management in Agriculture, 2007). ............................................................ 18 
Figure 5. Proposed concept for helping water managers and regulators better prepared to 
adapt and transform water governance arrangements. .......................................... 34 
 
  
www.trust-i.net - info@trust-i.net                    Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements  D23.2       -3- 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous tasks in TRUST have explored adaptive capacity and adaptive potential in the 
context of the water sector and have offered insight to and guidelines for resilient, adaptive 
water management systems. The TRUST reports emanating from Tasks 21.2 and 23.2 for 
instance, provide analysis and recommendations on the extent to which companies can 
support transitions towards more sustainable Urban Water Cycle Systems (UWCS). The 
TRUST report from Task 21.1 defines the concepts of risk, resilience and vulnerability in the 
context of the water sector, while Deliverable 12.1 defined guidelines for adaptive strategic 
planning. Deliverable 23.2 draws on and further develops these outputs. 
The aim of Deliverable 23.2 is to develop a conceptual model of sustainable and stable 
water governance arrangements, allowing water service companies and regulators to 
improve the resilience of water distribution agreements. Stability, in terms of distributive 
justice, is often seen as necessary for a viable community (Rawls, 1993). There are two types 
of movements away from stability: (1) those relating to desertion (i.e. the free-rider 
problem); and (2) the pressing for renegotiation of the justice contract. Therefore, instability, 
in this sense, reflects a level of dissatisfaction felt by individuals regarding a previously 
agreed set of distributive justice principals of water allocation. Without stability in allocation 
outcomes, frictions can emerge, promoting conflict and influencing perceptions of justice. 
By analysing competing theories and drawing on relevant case studies, the aim of this task 
has been realised. The report is structured as follows. A formal assessment of the dynamics 
between (i) the stability of water governance arrangements and (ii) the procedural and 
distributional justice considerations that determine how water is allocated is presented in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we examine water allocation procedures in two countries with 
contrasting water availability statuses. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of how the features of 
water governance systems relate to adaptive management theory. Evidenced conclusions 
on the strengths and weaknesses of various governance models as the physical systems they 
govern are exposed to unstable operating conditions (climate, demand, competing uses etc.) 
are drawn upon in Chapter 5. Lastly, a proposed concept for water managers and regulators 
on how water governance arrangements can be made fit for purpose to deliver its objectives 
and the needs of stakeholders effectively where (i) resource availability is highly variable, 
and (ii) there is rapid change in the nature of demand (uses, qualities etc.) is described in 
Chapter 6. 
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 2. DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE STABILITY OF WATER GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS AND THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT DETERMINE 
HOW WATER IS ALLOCATED 
2.1. Water governance arrangements  
Definitions of the concept of water governance vary. The Global Water Partnership (2002) 
describes it as the political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to 
develop and manage water resources and the delivery of water services at different societal 
levels. Likewise, Rogers and Hall (2003) specify that water governance is concerned with the 
political, social and economic organisations and institutions that are important for water 
development and management, as well as the functions, balances and structures internal to 
the water sector (internal governance). Tropp (2007) provides a wide-ranging review of 
water governance definitions. These can be summarised to describe water governance as the 
means by which decision-makers determine and act on goals regarding water resource use 
and service delivery. In practical terms, this involves designing appropriate policies and 
organisational frameworks and ensuring resources are available in order to effectively 
implement these.  
Water governance arrangements set out the principals, policies and organizational 
frameworks through which water service providers (or other governance bodies) should use 
water resources and deliver water services to society. More specifically, they are used as a 
means to account for both water resource management and how people interact with each 
other and with institutions such as governments in relation to water resource use. In this 
sense, a change in water governance arrangements expectedly results in a change in 
outcomes for people, ecosystems and resources (Figure 1). This emphasises the importance 
of societal and industrial actors, governance procedures and resource management in 
shaping developments in water governance arrangements towards beneficial directions. 
 
Figure 1. Changing water governance 
arrangements lead to changing outcomes 
and resources (Franks et al., 2013, p.7). 
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 The nature of governance arrangements and their effectiveness reflects the context in which 
the water is being used (e.g. irrigation, drinking, industrial use) and at which scale 
(catchment, urban, national, cross-boundary). The resultant arrangements typically exhibit 
the structural characteristics of one or more modes of governance. Modes of governance are 
conceptualised in the governance literature on spectrums that are often described by the 
opposing ideal types of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘market’ (Figure 2) or ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ 
governance structures (Figure 3). Between these types, further modes of governance have 
been identified, such as distributed and co-governance (Schneider and Kenis, 1996). These 
modes of governance are known as ‘ideal types’ because, in reality, only hybrid forms are 
likely to be found as one mode entails elements of another (Treib et al., 2005).  
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptions of modes of 
governance (Treib et al., 2005, p.7). 
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 Below we describe the governance modes that are of most prevalence in and relevance to 
the water sector. Note that this is not an exhaustive list and some governance modes have 
been grouped due to the encompassment of similar attributes and overlapping semantics 
(e.g. centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic and top-down governance). There are also similar 
modes that have deliberately not been grouped in order to emphasise the inherent 
differences in their outcomes. For example, although bottom-up governance may be 
described as a polycentric mode of governance, it is a more specifically decentralised form 
(and therefore moves to the right on the centralisation-decentralisation continuum – Figure 
3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Centralisation-
decentralisation continuum (modified 
from Malone, 1997, Figure 3). 
• Polycentric governance 
In polycentric governance regimes, authority and functions are distributed among several 
centres that relate with one another mutually under a general system of rules (Ostrom 
1996). In this sense, it is a decentralized mode of governance. The process involves 
negotiations among stakeholders competing for resources and finding ways of providing 
services at different scales. The academic literature often views water governance 
arrangements as polycentric (McGinnis, 2011). For example, Thailand’s 1997 Constitution 
gave authorisation for community involvement in managing local natural resources, which 
brought about the emergence of polycentric water governance in northern Thailand (Tan-
Kim-Yong et al., 2002). This process included common property organisations that held 
resource rights based on local and state law.  
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 • Distributed and network governance 
Distributed governance (also termed network governance) is a form of polycentric 
governance that involves interdependent actors working together to deliver a public service. 
Decision-making is based on negotiations rather than the all-embracing rationality that 
governs hierarchical or centralised systems or the procedural reasoning involved in market-
centric governance (Wang, 2013). Compliance is ensured through regulations and, gradually, 
behavioural norms.  
• Bottom-up governance  
Bottom-up governance arrangements allow stakeholders to provide input to negotiating, 
formulating and implementing policy (e.g. by ensuring public participation). This requires 
cooperation among multiple public and private sector actors in order to prevent the 
interactive and inclusive process from becoming meaningless in decision making 
(Edelenbos, 2005). In Europe, for example, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) advocates 
bottom-up governance as a model for a single system of water management by 
encouraging a focus on management by river basin geography, rather than according to 
political or administrative boundaries (EC, 2014). This approach fosters participation at the 
local level (Lockie & Higgins, 2007). 
• Co-governance 
Co-governance encompasses a participatory management process in which the decisions of 
stakeholders are recognised equitably. It therefore necessitates the development of non-
centralized rules affecting the use and management of resources (Quilligan, 2013). In New 
Zealand, for instance, a co-governance agreement between the Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere 
Management Board and Environment Canterbury was established in 2012 for both parties to 
share commitment to the restoration and management of Te Waihora and its catchment (Te 
Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and Environment Canterbury, 2012). 
• Self-governance 
Self-governance describes a community of stakeholders who can exercise power without 
intervention from any authority. It emerges (or is sought) in cases where geographic, 
religious or ethnic groups perceive that a national government does not represent them or 
where a monarch or colonial rule ceases. It also arises where land and water rights in terms 
of ownership and property rights are in dispute and, in terms of international law, the 
concept of national sovereignty (i.e. the self-governance of nation-states) is commonly 
observed and discussed (Rogers and Hall, 2003). 
• Centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic and top-down governance 
Centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic and top-down governance approaches take the form 
that each actor or entity involved in implementing a governance regime, with the exception 
of one, is inferior to another actor or entity. In other words, water resources are broadly 
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 managed from a central bureaucracy. In comparison to polycentric governance, centralized 
governance (and similar) regimes can appear ordered and more comprehensive. Its structure 
can be observed in, for example, the hierarchical or vertical control of a state or government. 
This has been described as an increasingly out-dated form of governance (Kooiman, 2003); 
however, its fundamentals can be observed in bureaucratic governance regimes – i.e. the 
structures and formal contractual relationships within organisations.  
• Market-centric governance 
Where the focus is to maintain and promote market expansion and technological 
innovation, water governance arrangements can be classified as market-centric. This 
approach can result in growth in a defined water sector; yet, it can also lead to a rise in 
pockets of inequality and social opposition. Furthermore, market-centric governance can be 
high risk as failures in technology and the economy, along with environmental degradation 
become internalised and impact the system (Stephan, 2012). In the past two decades, 
private sector management, and commercial principles and practices have been instilled in 
the water sector in many countries (Bakker, 2010a). However, the existence of functioning 
water markets (where water is actually traded) has been dismissed, particularly for urban 
uses (Bauer, 2004; Castro, 2011).  
The arrangements that are operationalised from these ideal-type modes of governance 
differ from one another in terms of the type and roles of actors, scope and levels of 
authority, legal basis, policy preferences and organizational elements (Menard & Saleth, 
2012). In turn, the interactions of such specific components within arrangements affects 
institutional performance in the water sector (Saleth & Dinar, 1999). A change in any of 
these factors can therefore also affect the performance of the water sector as a service 
provider, as explored further in Section 3.2 below. 
2.2. Changes to water governance arrangements  
Research has discussed shifts in modes of environmental governance (Greenhalgh and 
Zaapagic, 2009) or recommended such shifts in order to achieve sustainable societal 
transformations (Van Zeijl-Rozema et al., 2008). For example, Driessen et al. (2012) set out 
to analyse and explain stability and dynamics in water governance in The Netherlands for 
the purpose of deriving recommendations for policy design. Based on influential bodies of 
literature for explaining policy change, these authors offer five key factors to explain shifts in 
modes of governance: a) physical circumstances (i.e. the environment, including population); 
b) infrastructure; (c) structural factors (i.e. rules and resources); (d) characteristics of agency 
(i.e. the capacity in the governing body); and (e) shock events (i.e. natural disasters, economic 
crises). Similarly, Rogers and Halls (2002) describe the forces that appoint changes in urban 
water governance as: (1) political shifts; (2) accessibility problems; (3) leakages/disruptions; 
(4) inequitable prices; (5) inflation; and (6) public debt. The relative stability of these forces 
determines expectations regarding accessibility, affordability, safety and sustainability of 
adequate water services. 
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 In this section, we explore these drivers of change, but rather than prescriptively follow 
factors identified by Driessen (2012) and/or Rogers and Hall (2002), we incorporate aspects 
of their analysis that are most applicable to the European water sector and the subsequent 
analysis of water allocation that follows this section. We specifically explore four factors 
that drive changes in water governance arrangements, and can subsequently form the basis 
for evaluating the dynamics between the stability of such arrangements, water allocation, 
and varying levels of water availability. The four factors, (1) physical environment and 
infrastructure; (2) characteristics of agency; (3) socio-political and regulatory trends; and (4) 
rules (i.e. governing principles such as laws and/or traditional standards), are mutually 
dependent and internally related in the sense that the operation of water governance 
arrangements is driven by legal, social, environmental, physical and political mechanisms. 
Facilitating or constraining change in any of these factors can lead, in turn, to instability in 
water governance arrangements. How these factors can drive change in water governance 
arrangements is specifically outlined below. 
Physical environment and infrastructure 
Increasing urbanisation necessitates new and/or revised flood protection strategies and, 
typically coupled with this is, rising urban populations, which calls for spatial planning. Rather 
than a state centralized/decentralized mode of governance encompassing, perhaps, 
traditional water management actors (e.g. those in charge of water treatment), such changes 
to the physical environment require a form of distributed governance (i.e. to allow for the 
involvement of planning and project developers, regional water authorities, local and 
regional governments etc.). Likewise, the strengthening of infrastructure is frequently part of 
regional and national climate change adaption strategies, which can entail similar 
amendments to water governance arrangements (Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013).  
Characteristics of agency  
Water service providers (and other governance bodies) can strive to either instil or resist 
change (e.g. through provision or isolation of resources, skill sets and knowledge levels and 
encouragement to change), which may ultimately impact on stability. Change, in this sense, 
may be brought about by, for instance, resource allocation (marketization), measures to 
enhance user participation (decentralisation) and/or performance incentives/sanctions 
(commercialisation) (Furlong, 2010). Examples of such practices are illustrated in Table 1. The 
change can be related to a desire for improved corporate performance, due to the recognition 
of a strong causal relationship between overseeing the direction and management of a 
business (corporate governance) and corporate performance (Scottish Government, 2014). 
Furthermore, the policy literature often attributes the accomplishments of robust 
organisations in the water sector to ‘good’ governance and describes changes that can be 
made in order to attain this goal (Grindle, 2007). It is notable that good governance in itself is 
inherently normatively driven, for example, the good governance agenda in response to the 
Washington Consensus (Santiso, 2001), which focuses on ‘getting institutions right’ for 
market-based (water) systems and shows that ‘agency’ is not value-free, but occurs in an 
ideological framework (whether market-based, government-led, or otherwise). 
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 Table 1: Examples of water sector 
governance reforms relating to the 
characteristics of agency (Bakker, 2014) 
GOAL OF REFORM TYPE OF REFORM EXAMPLE FROM THE WATER SECTOR 
Resource allocation Marketization 
 Introduction of a water market in Chile 
(Bauer, 1998). 
Performance 
incentives/sanctions 
Commercialisation 
 Commercial principals introduced (e.g. full 
cost recovery) in water management in South 
Africa (McDonald & Ruiters, 2005). 
User participation 
Decentralisation or 
devolution 
 Devolving water quality monitoring to lower 
orders of government or individual water 
users in Babon River, Indonesia (Susilowati 
and Budiati, 2003; Bakker, 2012). 
Socio-political and regulatory trends  
As mentioned previously, national sovereignty, political ideology, and social values all have 
a role to play in the shaping of water governance arrangements; as is also the case for 
instance with property rights, economic crises, or corruption (Rogers and Hall, 2003). There 
may be socio-political pressures or aspirations to improve the effectiveness of water 
management, and therefore stakeholders, bodies or countries lobby for high-level 
institutional changes to governance arrangements. For example, at the 2001 International 
Freshwater Conference in Bonn, water governance was identified as the most important 
area for action (UN, 2001). State representatives in attendance at the Bonn conference also 
proposed that countries should have appropriate water governance arrangements in place 
for managing affairs at all levels and, where feasible, to accelerate water sector reforms 
(Rogers et al., 2005). Tropp (2007) points out that such changes have tended to lead to 
either basin-based decentralization (e.g. in the case of countries prioritising their obligations 
to fulfil the objectives of the European Water Framework Directive), or more market-based 
governance arrangements with increased cost recovery and user and private sector 
participation. Important or proposed changes in water governance may be observed when 
an authority perceives water sector reform will bring political and social benefits, which may 
occur after political change or to influence votes before an election (Menard and Saleth, 
2012). However, the process of reversing, for instance, market-based policies on a large-
scale, is a difficult feat and may be undesired by stakeholders.   
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 Rules 
Due to the relationship between water governance arrangements and other institutional 
arrangements, Saleth and Dinar (2006) suggest that no particular arrangement is effective in 
all contexts regarding urban water governance. This raises difficulties for decision makers 
and, whether their goals are financial, political, equity, sustainability, the stability of 
governance arrangements are likely to be impacted. In some cases the law reinforces or 
retracts from this stability. For example, in the Netherlands, the Dutch Water Law reinforces 
the precise responsibilities of Rijkswaterstaat and regional water authorities (Van Rijswick 
and Havekes, 2012; Driessen et al., 2012).  
2.3. The procedural and distributional justice considerations that 
determine how water is allocated 
Water allocation refers to the rules and availability considerations through which access to 
water is decided for individual or communal use. In making allocation decisions, governance 
bodies apply procedural (whether formal or informal) rules. With regards to why decisions 
are made, Vermunt and Tornblom (2006) identify the following three dimensions to 
procedural rules that affect whether or not justice is deemed to be realised: 
(1) Structural – pertaining to whether the procedures through which decisions are 
made form part of a nation’s, organisation’s or other entity’s legal framework. 
(2) Cultural – a water service provider (or other governance body) may have a culture 
of working with local governments or other stakeholders to exploit opportunities 
and work together or they may have a closed off system whereby stakeholders 
cannot participate. ‘Culture’ can also refer to the way in which management views 
evidence and makes subsequent decisions – for instance, decisions could reflect 
proprieties based on profit, the environment, political reasons etc.  
(3) Personal – this includes the ways decisions are communicated to the people 
affected by the procedure, which may or may not do justice to these people. 
One of the earliest studies that sought to relate procedures to justice evaluations was 
conducted by Thibaut and Walker (1975). They observed that stakeholders were more 
satisfied in an adversarial legal system (i.e. involving a jury) than the stakeholders in a 
continental legal system (i.e. relying on one or more judges to investigate a case). Thibaut 
and Walker suggested that the adversarial system appeared to allow both parties in a 
dispute to have some control over the outcome – and thus stakeholders perceived that this 
increased their likelihood of receiving a positive outcome. More recently, Tyler and Lind 
(1992) studied the role of procedures in group behaviour. They hypothesized that being able 
to raise an opinion within a group or society is viewed as an indicator of self worth within 
that group and that it partially reflects the rewards that that member will gain from group 
decisions that are made. 
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 Distributive justice refers to the fairness of an allocation outcome. What is perceived by a 
customer or consumer as being a just allocation or route to access can depend a number of 
factors, including: 
(1) Need – those who need more water, from a distributive justice perspective, should 
be allocated more than those who already have a sufficient supply.  
(2) Expectations – whether the outcome is perceived by the receiver as a gain or a loss 
(i.e. unbiased division is likely to be seen as fair by beneficiaries who view what 
they receive as a gain). 
(3) Reputation of supplier/governance body – if there is a good relationship between 
the giver and receiver and the supplier is viewed positively, then the level of equity 
is likely to be viewed as fairer (and vice versa). 
(4) Supply – depending on how water is managed and how much is available, the 
justness of the allocation outcome may be thought of differently.  
(5) Stability – without stability in allocation outcomes, frictions emerge, promoting 
conflict and influencing perceptions of justice.  
Of the dimensions listed above, stability renders further comment, as it is a key thematic 
component of the prescriptive literature on distributive justice because its achievement is 
widely seen as a prerequisite for a viable community (Rawls, 1971, 1993). Within a 
distributional justice context, movements away from stability have been characterised as 
being either: (a) those resulting in a tendency to defect (e.g. the free-rider problem); or (b) 
those resulting in a tendency to press for renegotiation of the justice contract. Therefore, 
instability is a reflection of the level of satisfaction felt by individuals with regard to a 
previously agreed set of justice principles. The ramifications of these two types of instability 
impact upon contrasting areas of society. Instabilities related to the free-rider problem are 
evident primarily in social and economic settings where individuals seek to reap the benefits 
of a just distribution arrangement without fulfilling the agreed duties. Contrastingly, 
instabilities of the second type (a tendency to press for renegotiation) constitute a prime 
stimulus for political activity. Indeed, changes of policy or government in democratic 
settings and revolutions in totalitarian settings can be viewed as the process of such 
renegotiation. It is interesting to note that within the descriptive literature, these two 
problems are often referenced but rarely discussed, although the former does receive 
expansive attention from other research fields such as game theory and micro-economics 
(see, for example; Dawes & Thaler, 1998; Andreoni, 1988; Kim & Walker, 1984). A challenge 
here for water service providers is to promote greater stability by exposing a framework 
within which instability in water allocation mechanisms can be reconciled. 
In terms of combined procedural and distributive justice considerations in water allocation 
mechanisms (referred here forth as ‘allocation criteria’), these vary depending on the 
complexity of the allocation task (location, government interventions) and pressures 
(demand, availability, financial, environmental) on the resource (Roa-García, 2014). 
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 Greenberg and Colquitt (2005) provide an overview of the theoretical models that have 
been developed to explain distributive and procedural justice evaluations. The following 
paragraphs examine three factors that strongly influence the dynamics of how water is 
allocated in the water sector. 
Stakeholder priorities  
The criteria for distributing water resources for drinking may differ vastly depending on 
stakeholder priorities. This means that a period of water scarcity could be matched with an 
allocation criterion based on priorities. For instance, in the case of irrigation versus domestic 
use - in Southern Spain, the agricultural sector is the biggest water resources consumer 
(Reca et al., 2001). According to Reca et al. (2001), the hydraulic policy measure taken to 
help with this is the construction of hydraulic regulation works (i.e. dams) in order to 
increase water resources (i.e. supply development). In this case, water is distributed to 
stakeholders according to their rights – and not according to economic efficiency in water 
use. In other cases, for example in market-centric (or similar profit driven) governance 
arrangements, a higher economic profitability of the water may result in greater allocation 
to a specific group of users.  
Reliability of supply 
Distribution criteria may undergo modification dependent upon the amount and quality of 
water available, with a distinction being made between conditions of surplus, sufficiency, 
quality fit for purpose and scarcity. For instance, access to better quality water might be 
judged on different grounds from access to more water. This is perhaps an obvious area 
where greater diversity could be built into water resource distribution policies. A suitable 
policy in this respect may match allocation criteria with resource availability through any 
one of a range of mechanisms. Periods of sufficient supply might be reflected by an 
allocation criterion based on equality.  
Equity  
Periods of plenty and periods of scarcity may attract an allocation criterion based on equity. 
Equity theories propose that a distribution occurring within a relationship will be equitable 
and just when the relations between the inputs brought into the relationship and the 
outcomes strived for in the relationship are perceived as being equal for all participants. 
However, the manner in which water is used differs (in terms of quality and quantity 
needed). Therefore, it could be argued that the equitable amount of water given should be 
directly proportional to the use such that there is no wastage or undersupply of the 
commodity. If an equal share of water is a human right or is considered common law, anti-
water privatization advocates have raised the question as to whether private, for-profit 
multinational water corporations running networked water supply are compatible with such 
principles. However, the status a human right conveys upon a resource is unclear. For 
example, the UN's Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights define water as a 
commodity as well as a cultural, social and good (ECOSOC 2003). In this sense, Bakker 2007 
and 2010b highlights that because human rights stem from an individualistic, libertarian 
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 philosophy, they are compatible with capitalist political economic systems – and therefore 
water rights, as currently embedded in international law are, compatible with water 
privatization or other types of market-based management. 
2.4. Dynamics between the stability of water governance arrangements 
and how water is allocated 
By examining the dynamics between the stability of water governance arrangements and 
water allocation considerations, a more complete picture of the potential impacts of 
allocation decisions and changes to governance arrangements on subsequent attitudes and 
behaviour can be made. This can help water service providers to anticipate drivers for 
change. Table 2details associations between the factors that affect the stability of water 
governance arrangements and water allocation criteria, and Table 3 provides an additional 
analysis of the relative strength of associations between the influencers of dynamics that are 
detailed in Table 2.  
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 Table 2: Associations between the factors that affect the 
stability of water governance arrangements (row 
headings) and water allocation criteria (column headings). 
 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
INFRASTRUCUTRE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AGENCY SOCIO-POLITICAL AND REGULATORY 
TRENDS 
RULES 
Stake-
holder 
priorities 
Pressure on governments to take more 
responsibility for flood, drought and climate 
change risk management has increased 
(Driessen et al, 2012), e.g., the 2014 financial 
investment into flood protection infrastructure 
in the UK as a result of recent rainfall events. 
This affects governance arrangements and has 
associated impacts on allocation criteria set 
out according to stakeholder priorities. 
Stakeholder views often need to be 
incorporated into plans and therefore the 
means by which decisions are made. 
Having the capacity and a willingness to change 
governance arrangements within an organisation can 
in part depend on stakeholder priorities in terms of 
water allocation (Giddens, 1984; Furlong, 2010). The 
underlying governance model would also influence 
this – e.g. market-centric versus a bottom up 
governance model. 
Socio-political influence to change water 
governance management may aim for 
high-level institutional change to 
governance arrangements (UN, 2001). 
This instability can be influenced by 
stakeholder priorities (Menard and Saleth, 
2012). The change to water governance 
arrangements for these reasons can then 
have knock-on dynamics to stakeholder 
priorities allocation criteria.  
Laws, for instance in times of economic 
crisis or property rights, are influenced by 
stakeholder priorities (Rogers and Hall, 
2003), which in turn can dictate both 
governance arrangements and allocation 
criteria depending on stakeholder priorities.  
Reli-
ability of 
supply 
Supply development measures have been 
taken to improve the reliability of water 
supplies in response to physical environment 
changes and, in some cases, aging 
infrastructure. For example, in southern Spain, 
hydraulic regulation works (e.g. dams) have 
been constructed to help increase water 
availability for domestic use (Reca et al., 2001).   
Progressive strategies, according to Bakker (2010a) 
are those that reform state governance while 
fostering and sharing different models of local 
resource management. In The Netherlands, for 
instance, the report of the Second Delta Committee 
was released to determine how to deal with climate 
change consequences. A Delta Fund was 
subsequently established and a Delta Commissioner 
appointed (Delta Committee, 2008).  
Distribution criteria may undergo 
modification dependent upon the amount 
and quality of water available, which is 
most evident during conditions of surplus, 
sufficiency, quality fit for purpose and 
scarcity (Foa & Stein, 1980).  
  
 Although stability, in terms of governance, 
is often referred to in the literature as 
‘lasting agreement’, distributive justice 
arrangements may include a waiver to 
allow the alteration of previously fixed 
criteria under certain circumstances – e.g. 
under conditions where reliability of supply 
is threatened. 
Equity 
In times of flooding, or where changes to 
water governance arrangements are driven by 
the physical environment and infrastructure, 
allocation criteria is more likely to be seen as 
just based on levels of equity. The opposite 
would apply where governance arrangements 
are, for instance, heavily centralised. 
The level of equity (in terms of water distribution 
criteria) one agency is prepared to accept or seek to 
implement can depend on the wider goals of an 
agency (and subsequently the stability of its water 
governance arrangements) and whether it has 
positive relationships with government, public and 
other agencies. During the 19th Century in the 
Netherlands, for instance, the changes made to 
water governance demonstrated on-going 
opposition between the provinces, the water boards 
and central government. 
The role of the consumer (a customer, or a 
community member), the media and 
government entails different rights, 
demands, responsibilities and 
accountabilities (Bakker, 2010a). Therefore 
trends or changes in what these roles 
entail can place pressure on the stability of 
water governance arrangements and 
influence the equity (or perceived equity) 
of allocation criteria. 
Equity, by its very nature, should be 
unaffected by law and incorporates 
everything with or without law (Hudson, 
2009). However in practice today, this can 
be overwritten by rules and where 
conditions are bound by legal statute e.g. 
EU countries bound by the WFD. Procedural 
justice in some countries is held by cultural 
premises that emphasise a legal treatment, 
which may not hold elsewhere (Törnblom 
and Vermunt, 1999). 
www.trust-i.net - info@trust-i.net                                                                                                                                                                                     Improving the resilience of water distribution agreements  D23.2       -16- 
 Table 3: General analysis (from the 
perspective of European water 
service providers) of the relative 
strength of associations between the 
influencers (or drivers) of dynamics in 
Table 2, showing high (red), medium 
(orange) and low (yellow).   
 PHYSICAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
AND 
INFRASTRUCUTRE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF AGENCY 
SOCIO-POLITICAL 
AND REGULATORY 
TRENDS 
RULES 
Stakeholder 
priorities 
     
Reliability of 
supply 
     
Equity 
     
 
 
This Chapter has focused on exploring various water governance arrangements and 
assessing the factors that affect their stability and how they influence water allocation 
criteria. In the following Chapter 3, we introduce two case studies countries with contrasting 
water availability statuses and investigate how the different water governance 
arrangements are operationalised in these counties.  
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 3. COMPARISON OF WATER ALLOCATION PROCEDURES IN A 
WATER SPARSE AND A WATER ABUNDANT COUNTRY 
Challenges in water allocation that lie ahead include the provision of adequate water 
supplies for increasing populations and housing, ensuring water abstraction is more 
sustainable and compliant with legislation and international agreements, and mitigating 
and adapting to the potential effects of climate change (CIWEM, 2012). Below we examine 
two countries with contrasting water availability statuses: (1) England, which has little or no 
water scarcity; and (2) Yemen, which is an area of physical water scarcity (Figure 4). Table 4 
provides a comparison of water allocation mechanisms and outcomes in England and 
Yemen. It is accompanied by Table 5, which describes various rights that are conferred as a 
result of water allocation procedures.   
 
Figure 4. Global areas of physical and 
economic water scarcity (Comprehensive 
Assessment of Water Management in 
Agriculture, 2007).   
England 
In England, water resources management is governed mostly by the water abstraction and 
impoundment licensing system and public water supplies are fully privatized (Table 3). This 
full privatization is coupled with laws prohibiting the disconnection of residential consumers 
and a strong regulatory framework for price and quality controls (Bakker, 2007). The 
arrangements are in notable contrast to the rest of the UK, where water service providers in 
Northern Ireland and Scotland are not independent from the Government. Water companies 
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 in England have a statutory duty to provide domestic and non-domestic customers with an 
adequate supply of water for household and business purposes – and plan to ensure that 
future demands can be met. Statutory provisions are laid out by the Water Act 2003, which 
requires providers to produce water resource management plans every 5 years.  
The English population is fortunate to have extensive freshwater resources. Domestic water 
use is approximately 145 litres/capita/day in 2008/09 (Environment Agency, 2009) and the 
total water supply for all customers in England and Wales is approximately 14.5 million cubic 
metres per day (Water UK, 2010). The absence of temperature extremes and rainfall during 
much of the year, typically without long drought periods are characteristic for England. The 
potential effects of climate and population change need to be an integrated consideration 
here as it is essential to consider whether England will have an adequate water storage 
capacity to provide a continuous supply of drinking water for commercial and domestic 
premises. 
Yemen 
The Yemen is located on the Arabian Peninsula and is encased by the Gulf of Aden and the 
Red Sea with a semi-arid to arid climate. The average annual rainfall ranges from 200mm in 
the highlands to 50mm in the largest part of the country, which makes it the most water 
scarce country in the Arab Nation (Van der Gun et al., 1995). Severe water scarcity is a key 
challenge in water management in Yemen. It is estimated that more than 90% of water 
abstraction in Yemen is for agricultural use and little more than 1% for industrial use (Naji & 
Ahmed 2009). The population is projected to increase by 74% by 2030 (IFAD 2009). 
Yemen has two major types of social and legal systems relating to water allocation: tribal 
'urf (customary) and Islamic law. Islamic law rules that surface water that is not contained 
belongs to nobody. Because, generally, less water is contained upstream, downstream 
ownership not only has a greater degree of legal protection (Kohler, 2000), but also a vastly 
greater supply of water. However, regarding customary law, the traditional water rule Al a’la 
fa al a’la dictates that upstream users of irrigation systems should have priority (Lawrence & 
van Steenbergen 2010). This has meant that water allocation has often been controlled by 
elders upstream (Varisco, 1983). Both rules clearly conflict with each-other (Table 4). 
In 1996, Yemen established the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) by separating 
(and consolidating) the water policy and planning function from the High Water Council 
(which since ceased to exist), the water resources assessment function from the Ministry of 
Oil and Mineral Resources, and the water monitoring function from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Independent agencies represent the water using sectors (i.e. the General 
Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects - GARWSP, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation - 
MAI and Local Corporations - LCs). However there is little collaboration among the separate 
bodies and the arrangements do not address the challenge of reallocating water from 
thousands of well-owners. Yemen’s water is over-allocated and it is challenging to 
reallocate from agricultural uses to high-value municipal and industrial uses. The reality is 
that decisions about water allocation are effectively heavily decentralized to hundreds of 
thousands of well-owners (i.e. water users at the local level). This arrangement could 
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 possibly be changed through market-based private sector participation, particularly because 
no public agency or planning structure in Yemen has succeeded in doing that thus far (Rees 
1998). However, Yemen Water may not be in support of a market-based private model as, in 
2010, it reported that privatization, the exclusion of marginalized groups and reallocation of 
water to urban areas are viewed by Yemen Water as water management flaws.  
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  Table 4: Comparison of water allocation mechanisms and 
outcomes in two countries with varying degrees of water 
availability and water governance systems.  
 FORM(S) OF 
WATER 
GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
PROCESSES OF 
WATER ALLOCATION 
AND FORM OF 
WATER 
GOVERNANCE 
REGIME 
WATER RIGHTS 
GENERATED BY 
THE 
ALLOCATION 
PROCESS 
WATER SERVICE PROVIDER(S) REGULATORY FRAMEWORK/ 
DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTICE 
PROTECTED BY 
ALLOCATION AND 
DISTRIBUTIONAL 
JUSTICE CONFLICTS 
England 
Market-centric, 
multilevel 
governance 
Market-based 
allocation, central-
authorisation 
Use, timing, 
duration and 
ownership, 
quantity, 
quality, 
assurance 
(Table 5) 
Anglian Water; Northumbrian Water; Severn 
Trent Water; Southern Water; South West Water; 
Thames Water; United Utilities; Wessex Water 
Yorkshire Water; Affinity Water; Bristol Water; 
Cambridge Water Company; Cholderton and 
District Water Company; Dee Valley Water; Essex 
and Suffolk Water; Hartlepool Water; Portsmouth 
Water; Sembcorp Bournemouth Water; South 
Staffordshire Water; Sutton and East Surrey 
Water 
1. Water Services Regulation 
Authority (Ofwat) - economic 
regulator 
2. Drinking Water Inspectorate – 
quality regulator 
3. Environment Agency 
Social opposition can 
arise where personal 
finances inhibit 
adequate supply. Also 
because the resource is 
a purchased 
commodity, supply 
expectations are high 
and therefore so too is 
the feeling of injustice 
when system failures 
occur  
 
Yemen Centralised and 
self-governance  
State administration 
(Islamic Law), 
traditional law 
(Tribal 'urf) 
Use, duration 
and ownership, 
transfer (Table 
5)  
National Water Resources Authority (public body), 
which distributes to the water using sectors (i.e. 
the General Authority for Rural Water Supply 
Projects - GARWSP, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Irrigation - MAI and Local Corporations - LCs)  
1. Multi-layer legal system  
2. Water Policy Framework  
 Allocation conflicts 
within a single 
catchment, i.e. in intra-
catchment conflicts 
about irrigation-water 
between farmers 
upstream and 
downstream 
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 Table 5: Descriptions of the various 
water rights that are conferred as a 
result of water allocation procedures 
(Table 4). These describe the extent of 
the use and control rights conferred to 
the user. Note that their nature (licenses, 
permits, access) varies in different 
jurisdictions (WWF, 2007). 
ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTION 
Quantity The amount of water the holder of the right may abstract 
Quality The water quality to be abstracted or disposed of 
Source The specific resource and location from which the right is awarded 
Timing 
Restrictions on the time that the right applies, i.e. times that the volume may be 
abstracted 
Assurance 
Some rights are absolute – 100% guarantee of a certain quantity and quality, 
while other rights have variable assurance of supply and quality depending on the 
available resource. This can be based, for example, on principles of priority or 
proportionality 
Use The specific use for which the water is abstracted (e.g. irrigation, mining, etc.) 
Duration and 
ownership 
The duration for which the holder is entitled to the rights conferred. Some rights 
are permanent while other rights are authorised for a specified period of time 
Transfer Whether the right can be sold, transferred to another person, location, or inherited 
Security and 
enforcement 
Details of the administrative body that has the legal mandate to award the right, 
including the extent of that mandate 
In this Chapter, we have investigated how water governance arrangements fit in different 
contexts with contrasting water availability statuses. In the following Chapter 4, we 
introduce adaptive management theory and investigate how this relates to stability and 
dynamics in water governance systems.  
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 4. HOW FEATURES OF WATER GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS RELATE TO 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT THEORY 
4.1. Adaptive management theory 
Adaptive management, and the related concept of resilience, has captured the interest of a 
wide range of actors in different professional fields, such as security, development and the 
environment. Within recent debates on environmental governance, socio-ecological 
resilience has attracted considerable attention. The ideal for socio-ecological systems is to 
become (more) resilient, i.e. being able “…to absorb disturbance and reorganise while 
undergoing change so as to retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and 
feedbacks” (Folke, 2006: 259). The resilience of socio-ecological systems is often claimed to 
support the goal of sustainable development (Berkes et al., 2003). 
Previous system theories founded on the existence of a single equilibrium point prompted 
linear and rational management interventions aimed at stabilizing or ‘bouncing back’ an 
unstable system (Davoudi, 2013). The idea that systems may be in a permanent state of 
instability and have to be managed under inherent uncertainty concerning future conditions 
increasingly replaced this thinking (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Socio-ecological systems, such 
as Urban Water Cycle Services (UWCS), came to be seen as complex, non-linear and self-
organizing entities, to be sustained under continuously changing conditions (Berkes et al., 
2003). Hence, norms changed from continuity to discontinuity, from being to becoming, and 
from seeing systems not as a fixed asset, but as a changing process (Davoudi, 2013).  
The notion that being or becoming adaptive can be managed – adaptive management – is 
welcomed by many academics and practitioners in the water sector today (Segrave, 2014). It 
is defined by Pahl-Wostl et al. (2011) as “…a systematic process for improving management 
policies and practices by systematic learning from the outcomes of implemented 
management strategies and by taking into account changes in external factors in a proactive 
manner”.  
A number of elements are considered essential to an adaptive management approach. 
Learning is a prominent one. As our understanding of how systems behave, how physical 
and social systems interact, as well as of what future conditions will be is inherently limited 
evolve, so learning from experience becomes increasingly important. It is assumed that 
organisations and institutions can learn like individuals do, which in turn enables learning on 
a social and institutional level (Berkes et al., 2003). Learning involves the testing of hard and 
soft management approaches and spans different kinds of processes, from the ecological to 
the economic (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). Flexibility and experimentation are also often 
mentioned as central elements in adaptive management. They stress the importance of 
being open to multiple pathways and innovative or unproven response options if progressive 
insight and iterative learning suggest that the current pathway is not (entirely) suitable to 
adequately deal with external challenges or when opportunities arise for renewal of the 
system (Folke, 2006).  
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4.2. Relationship to the stability of water governance arrangements and 
distribution criteria 
As described above, adaptive management has taken root as an ideal management 
approach for UWCS. However, as Smith (2012) indicates, there is a tension between the 
concepts and ideas proposed by adaptive management theory and some inherent inflexible 
characteristics of our water systems, notably their physical infrastructure. That is why 
Segrave (2014) holds that adaptiveness in the context of water systems is not based on 
investing in either extremes of flexibility (i.e. a dynamic system that can alter its course of 
action or structure in response to changing circumstances) or robustness (i.e. a system that 
can withstand change without altering its structure or activities), but ideally constitutes a 
balance between those opposites. In addition to these options of investing in flexibility and 
robustness, there are options of investing in time and knowledge to cope with uncertainty, 
for instance by delaying interventions and investing in research that seeks to better 
understand the potential consequences of particular interventions (Meijer, 2007).    
In Table 3, we inferred the relationships between the stability of water governance 
arrangements and water allocation criteria. From this, we draw on the most prominent 
features of water governance systems to detail below how these work together – or 
misalign with relevant characteristics of adaptive management theory. Table 6 presents a 
summary of this analysis. 
Balancing water governance stability and system flexibility 
Flexibility, in terms of adaptive management theory, refers to the ability of an organization 
to adapt to upcoming or unforeseen circumstances and providing room for bottom-up 
initiatives. Ensuring the continuity of water governance arrangements under flexible 
conditions can therefore present conflicting strategies and modes of action – particularly 
where the arrangements in place follow a top-down or hierarchical structure. Visions and 
strategic directions from the top may not reach the lower echelons, while suggestions for 
improvement from operational workers may not reach the higher echelons in time for 
adaptive management actions to be effective (Büscher & Gormley, 2014). Furthermore, and 
as previously mentioned regarding water allocation criteria, having the capacity and a 
willingness to change governance arrangements within an organisation can in part depend 
on stakeholder priorities in terms of water allocation (Giddens, 1984; Furlong, 2010).  
Dealing with uncertainty while ensuring supply reliability  
In UWCS, there is a paradox of encouraging adaptive decision-making in an industry with 
infrastructure and processes in place that were intended to be stable, predictable and 
somewhat inflexible. Where human interaction causes a problem to water quality – the 
adaptive solution is to deal with the source (a catchment management solution), rather than 
build water treatment capacity to remove the problem. The effectiveness of a catchment 
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 management solution will be reliant on people’s behaviours now and in the future, but it 
can be flexible and responsive to climate change or environmental legislation etc. In the 
same context, supply development measures have been implemented to improve the 
reliability of water supplies in response to physical environment changes and, in some cases, 
aging infrastructure. For example, as previously described, in southern Spain, hydraulic 
regulation works were constructed to help increase water availability for domestic use (Reca 
et al., 2001). However, taking action to ensure adaptation to future unknown circumstances 
has an optimum point, beyond which the opportunity to ensure supply reliability may cease 
to become greater and investment is unjustified and/or ill-feeling is raised due to a lack of 
return (perceived or real) on previous investments. This could be observed, for instance, in 
the implementation of a new chemical treatment technology that intended to improve the 
reliability of water quality but, instead, required new levels of training and maintenance 
that over-complicated the system to the point that the technology implementation was 
met with resistance. 
Learning, anticipating change and instilling equity  
From an adaptive management perspective, it is important to know about or gain insight 
into external trends and developments and the behaviour and strategies of associated 
actors, including citizens. This is because UWCS functions and activities are carried out in the 
greater urban environment and are thus partially dependent on other socio-natural 
processes. UWCS often fulfil water cycle services on behalf of local and regional government 
and non-government bodies and ultimately need to receive legitimation from these broader 
bodies. If, for instance, an adaptive management intervention is proposed that generates an 
immediate detrimental effect on the environment and/or living or economic conditions (e.g. 
water distribution), such plans can cause civil opposition to the point that plans must change 
in order for any progress to be achieved. Some activities and procedures, however, are 
clearly “must do’s” as prescribed by policy, law or (EU) directives. In this sense, an optimal 
solution (in terms of adaptability and water distribution) should be sought when dealing 
with legislation. This is particularly important in cases where distribution criteria are not 
health based. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sets 20 
litres per day as the minimum daily amount of water for basic needs. According to Hey 
(2009) economic and population growth will increase water consumption to the point that, 
by 2025, approximately 3 billion people will live in arid or semiarid countries with less than 
1,700 cubic metres per person annually (the level below which water stress is considered to 
occur). Considering such health-based guidelines from a distributive justice perspective, the 
just and adaptive approach should be based on science and learning from socio-political and 
regulatory trends and effects. In other words, legislation should be questioned as to whether 
it aligns with, for example, goals pertaining to human health implications.  
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 Table 6. How the most prominent 
features of water governance 
systems (Table 4) work together – or 
misalign with relevant characteristics 
of adaptive management theory 
ESSENTIAL TO 
ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE STABILITY OF WATER GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA 
 Balancing water 
governance 
stability and 
system flexibility 
Ensuring the continuity of water governance arrangements under flexible 
conditions can have conflicting strategies and modes of action. Directions from 
high levels in governance arrangements may not reach the lower echelons, 
while suggestions for improvement from operational workers may not to reach 
the higher echelons in time for adaptive management actions to be effective 
(particularly in top-down regimes). 
Dealing with 
uncertainty while 
ensuring supply 
reliability 
Supply development measures have been taken to improve the reliability of 
water supplies in response to (uncertain) physical environment changes and, in 
some cases, aging infrastructure. However, taking action to ensure adaptation 
to future circumstances has an optimum point, beyond which the opportunity 
to ensure supply reliability may cease to become greater and investment is 
unjustified. 
Learning, 
anticipating 
change and 
instilling equity 
From a distributive justice perspective, the just approach should be not solely 
based on legislation – but also based on (unbiased) science (e.g. health 
impacts) and learning from socio-political and regulatory trends and effects 
(i.e. what works and will be acceptable in terms of allocation). Governance 
regimes should be implemented in a transparent way that is conducive to 
learning and adapting. Yet, UWCS typically must receive legitimation from 
local and regional government and non-government bodies and are partially 
dependent on other socio-natural processes. Adaptive management in this 
sense is thus not always feasible.  
 
In this Chapter, we have drawn out common and contrasting elements of adaptive 
management and water governance arrangements. It has been evident that the physical 
systems which water governance models govern are exposed to instable operating 
conditions (climate, demand, competing uses etc.). Based on these insights and those in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (i.e. the factors affecting stability in various water governance 
arrangements and water allocation criteria), we will next highlight specific strengths and 
weaknesses of water governance models in the following Chapter.  
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 5. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF GOVERNANCE MODELS  
Evidenced strengths and weaknesses in the variety of water governance models available 
are expected considering the instability of the operating conditions that the physical 
systems they govern are exposed to (climate, demand, competing uses etc.). Before further 
observation can be made, it is first important to define what is a strength and what 
constitutes a weakness in water governance models.  
The UN (2006) identifies typical weaknesses of water governance arrangements as being 
institutional structures and finances that are fragmented (and unpredictable for investors), a 
lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities, and, in the regulatory environment, dubious 
water allocation criteria and low capacity and accountability of implementing organisations, 
politicians and policy-makers. On the other end of the spectrum, the strengths of successful 
water governance models were classified by the UN (2003) as in-built accountability, 
decentralization (in terms of delegation to the lowest feasible level), participation, 
transparency, as well as ensuring equity, efficiency and integration. Similarly, Marchildon 
(2009), notes accountability, decentralization (i.e. more user-based), participation, 
transparency, predictability and financial sustainability as key strengths in successful 
governance models. 
Ideally and succinctly, water governance has a clear benefit for end-users. According to most 
justice systems, all individuals within a locality are entitled to water supply as a human 
right. If the end-user benefit is, fundamentally, a just set of water allocation rules a good 
water governance model will thereby ensure end-users have equitable access to a water 
supply. However, variations in local, regional and international water uses, availability (the 
natural and built environment) and user cultures (organisational attributes, along with 
community and individual belief systems and behaviours) mean that while weaknesses in 
one model can be observed from one perspective – strengths can be observed from another. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the governance models analysed in this report are detailed 
in Table 7 and described further below according to the different perspectives noted above.  
Strengths and weaknesses 
The manner in which water is used differs from one household to another and thus it is vital 
to consider such differences during water supply. For water stability to be ensured under 
governance arrangements, there are costs to be incurred to improve the distribution 
channels in terms of maintenance and enhancement for efficient services (Draper 2006). The 
costs of obtaining, distributing and treating water are some of the constant incurred on a 
regular basis. In this context, a strength may be observed by some in the market-centric, 
distributed governance model adopted by England (Table 4). That is, costs are accounted for 
and, in general, variations among household demands are met and paid for accordingly. 
Additionally, there is little reason why the same distribution criteria that are applied to clean 
drinking water should not be applied to the distribution of sub-potable water for irrigation. 
This is particularly important in areas where the level of water availability is scarce and it 
highlights a weakness in the self-governance model (Table 7), as adopted in Yemen for 
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 instance (Table 4). The value of an identical volume and quality of water is variable across 
individuals within the same community – depending on what its intended purpose is and 
how important that purpose is to the user. 
In a similar context, individuals carry several competing views of justice that are applied in 
different contexts (Miller, 1991). A sense of justice is thereby not a simple ‘one rule for all 
cases’ phenomenon, but rather a complex, contextually sensitive set of considerations. 
Mitchell et al (1993) succinctly define justice as a dynamic, ever shifting equilibrium 
between the excesses of too little regulation on the one hand and too much on the other. 
Broadly stated, individuals modify their opinion of what is a just distribution criterion as the 
details of the situation evolve. For example, with regard to variances in resource availability, 
Hegtvedt (1987) found a positive correlation between reward scarcity and the type of justice 
criteria selected. Under conditions of resource scarcity, equality was the preferred criteria, 
whereas under conditions of resource abundance, equity was the preferred principle. This 
identifies both a strength and a weakness of polycentric governance models – depending on 
need and whether the outcome is perceived by the receiver as a gain or a loss (Table 7).  
As described previously, ideally, elements of adaptive management should be integrated 
into water governance arrangements in order that water needs can be met under unstable 
operating conditions. This will require a degree of investment and willingness to change, 
learn and try out new solutions – notable strengths of bottom-up governance (Table 7) – 
and ultimately a weakness in top-down centralized models. Moreover, ever greater levels of 
global economic and political integration, and increasing pressure on both natural and other 
types of economic resources have created a problem for policy makers as they seek a 
framework within which cross-culturally just resource distributions can be derived. It is no 
longer sufficient to merely expose differences in cross-cultural attitudes to just resource 
distributions. Policy makers will require information concerning the sources or determinants 
of these differences. A related strength of distributed, network co-governance models is 
that they have an ingrained capacity to negotiate and build participative catchment 
management solutions in order to meet this challenge.  
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 Table 7. Strengths and weaknesses of 
various water governance models.  
GOVERNANCE 
MODEL 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
Polycentric 
governance 
• Water services can be provided at different scales 
based on negotiations among stakeholders. 
• Providing room for bottom-up initiatives – 
suggestions for improvement from operational 
workers may reach the higher echelons in time for 
adaptive management actions to be taken. 
• Ensuring the continuity of water governance 
arrangements under flexible conditions  - visions 
and strategic directions from the top may reach 
the lower echelons. 
• If water is equally divided, then in terms of 
equality, that may be viewed as a fair share. 
However, if that same share is viewed in terms of 
equity – it may be seen as unjust. Therefore, the 
party who does not benefit may see the division 
as unfair.  
• In heavily decentralised arrangements, water can 
be over-allocated. This creates challenges, not 
only in times of short supply, but also it is more 
difficult to reallocate (particularly from one 
industry to another, e.g. agriculture to municipal 
use) once arrangements are in place.  
Distributed 
and network 
governance 
• Stakeholder negotiations inform decision making 
and therefore support for decisions is generally 
high – as is the perception that allocation criteria 
are just. 
• Caters for changes to the physical environment as 
planning and project developers, regional water 
authorities, local and regional governments etc. 
give input to decisions. This also enables 
management approaches to be more adaptive. 
• Compliance is enforced through regulations and 
the actions are therefore not necessarily 
supported or viewed throughout the system as 
just in terms of allocation criteria. 
• If water supply is low in one area, allocation 
criteria may not ensure adequate supply. 
Bottom-up 
governance 
• Allows stakeholders to provide input to 
negotiating, formulating and implementing 
policy. This gives water service providers a level of 
capacity to change water governance. 
arrangements in conditions where that is needed 
• Is conducive to building catchment management 
solutions – or instilling water management by 
river basin programs (as endorsed by the Water 
Framework Directive, for example). This 
eliminates administrative or political boundaries 
and focuses on challenges at the local level, 
fostering participation. 
• More likely to have a culture that encourages 
stakeholders and/or local governments to seek 
new opportunities to exploit together in order to 
overcome new challenges. 
• Resource intensive as it requires cooperation 
among multiple public and private sector actors 
to ensure the process is meaningful. 
• Arrangements may be targeted for reform due to 
socio-political pressures (or higher expectations 
with regards water management)– and bottom 
up governance arrangement may be more 
susceptible to this. 
• Criteria differ vastly depending on stakeholder 
priorities, irrigation versus domestic use; therefore 
the optimal decision may be difficult to reach. 
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 Co-
governance 
• As the decisions of stakeholders are recognised 
equitably – stakeholders support resource 
management decisions made under these 
regimes, as they generally perceive their level of 
control increases their chance of receiving a 
positive (from their perspective) outcome. 
• Can support adaptive management because 
adaptive management requires an inherent 
capacity and willingness to change – so because 
co-governance is a participatory management 
process, it allows for the development of non-
centralised rules, which are responsive and can 
adapt to changing conditions (legislation, weather 
pressures, financial, infrastructure modifications, 
new technology etc.). 
• From a water allocation perspective, because 
non-centralised rules are developed regarding the 
use and management of resources – it may not be 
the fairest of procedures – particularly if there are 
sectors or populations without sufficient access. It 
may also not be the most efficient system for 
resource management if priorities differ across 
decentralised segments. 
Self-
governance 
• Giving stakeholders the ability to exercise power 
without intervention from any authority can lead 
to feels that ultimate stakeholder rewards are 
being gained – and that resources can be 
conserved in times of excess and used in times of 
need – implying a sense of self-stability and 
sufficiency. 
• Decisions may not be just all stakeholders and 
subsequently disputes and unrest may arise. 
Those without any form of control on the 
arrangements can be (or perceive to be) 
discriminated against. 
• With no intervention from authority – 
arrangements and decisions can be easily 
changed and become instable, which can also 
promote conflict and affect perceptions of 
allocation justice. 
Centralised, 
hierarchical, 
bureaucratic 
and top-
down 
governance 
• Ordered and comprehensive rationality for 
decision making – creating a perceived stability 
• If the reputation of the arrangements is good then 
it is likely to be viewed as a fair level of equity. 
• Water can be reallocated or redistributed based 
on a central decision making agency if needed. 
• All but one entity involved in the regime is inferior 
to another, which is an increasingly unpopular 
approach to governance. 
• Stakeholders may have no opportunity to 
participate in decisions and if a governance body 
has a bad reputation then it is likely to be view 
negatively, creating conflict. 
• More difficult to accommodate bottom-up 
initiatives – thus in times of change to the 
physical environment (e.g. flooding) and/or 
infrastructure, the arrangements may not adapt 
easily and therefore may be seen as unjust. 
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 Market-
centric 
governance 
• Accommodates technological innovations, 
research and development and can create water 
sector growth (due to increased cost recovery), 
improving the potential for greater allocation and 
stability in supply. 
• Thrives to instil change and expand according to 
external circumstances – creating a more 
adaptive (and resilient) sector. 
• Failures in technology, the economy and 
environmental degradation become internalised 
and impact the system – threatening supply and 
stability.  
• Social opposition can arise where personal 
finances prevent equality, which raises the 
question whether this model is compatible with 
the human right to water. 
• Reform of arrangements under this system can be 
used as a political tool – where an authority 
believes changes to water charges would bring 
political and social benefits – but the reform may 
not benefit water supply. Note that it is possible 
for this to occur under the other modes of 
governance, however it is observed more so for 
market-centric governance arrangements due to 
their direct financial implications to society. 
 
Thus far, we have offered insights into various forms of water governance arrangements – 
from the perspective of stability, water allocation, adaptive management and their 
effectiveness. A clear challenge for water managers and regulators in developing, 
implementing and transforming water governance arrangements is the high variability of 
water demand (e.g. uses, volumes, quality) and its availability. In the next Chapter, we will 
bring these insights gained together with guidance on balancing system stability and 
dynamics while building more adaptive governance systems (and therefore often 
transforming governance arrangements) to offer advice on how water governance 
arrangements could be made fit for purpose.  
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 6. CAN WATER GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENT BE MADE FIT FOR 
PURPOSE? 
Our discussion now focuses on how water governance arrangements can be made fit for 
purpose for water managers and regulators where resource availability is highly variable, 
and there is rapid change in the nature of demand (uses, qualities etc.). Achieving this goal 
broadly entails both transformative and adaptive water governance arrangements (4.2) that 
can accommodate changes that affect stability (i.e. the physical environment and 
infrastructure, characteristics of agency, socio-political and regulatory trends, rules [Section 
3.2]) and the factors affecting water allocation criteria (i.e. stakeholder priorities, reliability 
of supply, equity [Section 3.3). These vary depending on the circumstances faced and the 
current practices and therefore guidance must account for this, as described further in the 
following sections.  
It should be noted that it is not the purpose or intention of this contribution to suggest 
specific policy options for resource distribution problems. The discussion presented in this 
section is therefore of an abstract nature, dealing in the conceptual rather than the 
functional / operational aspects of the subject matter. It should be born in mind that both 
this and the previous section constitute an interpreted extrapolation of the foregoing 
discussions and as such are intended as propositional rather than prescriptive. 
Balancing the factors affecting system stability and dynamics in water allocation criteria 
As noted previously, we may expect to observe variety in selected distribution criteria as the 
level of water availability moves from plenty, through sufficiency to scarcity. There is also 
little rational reason why the same distribution criteria that are applied to clean drinking 
water should be applied to the distribution of sub-potable water for irrigation. The water 
use and the circumstances of the user can be anticipated to be significant modifiers of justice 
sentiments. For example, with regard to variances in resource availability, Hegtvedt found 
that under conditions of resource scarcity, equality was the preferred criteria, whereas under 
conditions of resource abundance, equity was the preferred principle (Hegtvedt, 1987). It has 
also been found that views on entitlement are related to both gender and occupational type 
(Moore, 1991). Further evidence suggests that different spheres of human action are 
associated with variances in the preferred principles of justice (Hochschild, 1981). Other 
empirical research has exposed evidence that chosen criteria for resource distribution are 
influenced by changes in resource type (Foa & Stein, 1980), the personal relationships 
between the donor and recipient (Peterson, 1975; Austin, 1980), group dynamics (Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986), social goals (Deutsch, 1975), and internalised normative values Rasinski, 
1987). 
Allowing a single ideological framework to determine just distribution for water that has 
different intended uses ignores the evidence that water availability and the nature of its 
demand is variable. This becomes more pertinent the greater the scale of (intended) 
application, highlighting the need for context specific solutions. An emphasis on 
contextually sensitive solutions reflects comments made by Aaron Wolf when reporting on 
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 distribution agreements for international watersheds. Wolf refers to  'a middle ground 
between the absolute uniqueness of each basin and the feasibility of delineating clear and 
guiding principles for allocations which would work like an algorithm for all the 
international waters of the world ' (Wolf, 1999). The application of ideas of requisite variety 
suggest that not only should inter-basin needs and settings influence distribution criteria, 
but that spatial and temporal variations in water availability, water quality, level of need 
etc. within the basin itself should also be allowed to influence allocations. This is an implicit 
recognition of the coevolutionary aspects of effective water management as it accepts that 
water has a fundamental role to play in supporting agriculture, leisure activities, freshwater 
habitats, local and regional economies, regional development and public health (an agenda 
reflected in the 1997 UN convention [UN, 1997]).  
In systemic terms, survival is ensured through adaptive change, which in turn is promoted by 
the generation of diversity or variety in sub-systems. For example, the survival of 
communities of organisms is promoted by diversity of individuals’ physical or behavioural 
characteristics. If we view the issue of stability as relating to ‘the contract that represents the 
agreement entered into by the various parties rather than the particular configuration of 
justice criteria that has been determined’, then the relevant level at which diversity is 
required is that of the criteria. In other terms, the resilience of the agreement will be 
promoted by the diversity of criteria represented in it.  
Integrating adaptive and transformative governance  
Traditionally, governance sets out the rules and responsibilities of involved organisations 
within formal institutions. The agreements can, in some cases, be long-term, binding and 
burdensome to change and hinder the involvement of stakeholders and decision-making. As 
shown, this can reduce adaptive capacity within water sector organisations. Adaptive 
governance deals with changing circumstances and purposes of governance by continuous 
learning and making timely decisions (Folke et al., 2005). At the early stages of 
implementing adaptive governance in urban water practitioners across three Australian 
cities, Rijke et al. (2012) demonstrated that a decentralized and informal governance model 
is most effective. An adaptive strategy as such would both ensure that sustainable water 
resource arrangements were negotiated rather than imposed, accommodate the need for 
geographical equity as recently highlighted by Haughton (1998), and provide some 
resilience in the face of global threats such as population growth and climate change (as 
noted in Miller et. al., 1997). It also has two significant corollaries; it would require 
implementing monitoring schemes to provide information on the current and anticipated 
status of waters and dependent systems, and it would involve a more intense and 
participatory form of water governance. 
Transformative governance (also known as transitions management), according to Wiek et 
al. (2011) enables progress in the transition from current practices towards the goal of 
having fit for purpose governance arrangements under water availability and demand 
variability. For instance, comparing current risk management levels in an organisation with 
its strategic goals can highlight the need for a transition. When the need for action is 
identified, learning may initiate a transition management process whereby the responsible 
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 authorities decide that policy development and implementation require structural changes 
and stakeholder involvement (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008). When a transition to a new 
arrangement is established (completed) – it is anticipated to be the result of centralized and 
formal governance approaches (Rijke et al., 2013). 
It is evident throughout this study that, depending on the circumstances, a variety of 
decentralised, centralised, informal and formal approaches can constitute a more successful 
model of water governance. A proposed concept for helping water managers and regulators 
be better prepared to adapt and transform water governance arrangements is presented in 
Figure 5. The initial stages of the concept incorporates elements of the adaptive strategic 
planning process as described in TRUST Deliverable 12.1 (Van der Zouwen et al., 2013) and 
the TRUST framework for understanding and improving adaptive capacity in water sector 
organisations as described in Deliverable 21.2 (Jeffrey et al., 2014). It can thus be seen as 
complementary to these TRUST frameworks. Fundamentally, Figure 5 integrates the factors 
presented in this report that have shown to influence stability in governance arrangements 
and distribution under availability and demand variability – to generic governance 
frameworks (i.e. plan, design, implement, operate – Hoogervorst, 2009) and governance 
implementation guidelines for the water sector (Pollard et al., 2013). As such, Figure 5 and 
its basis in this report provides an alternative starting point to generate discussion among 
water managers and regulators who wish to evaluate the effectiveness of established 
governance arrangements and estimate the chance of success of, if desired, organisational 
reform. 
 
Figure 5. Proposed concept for helping water managers and regulators 
better prepared to adapt and transform water governance arrangements.  
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 7. CONCLUSIONS 
The research reported above highlights a stability-change paradox in water governance 
arrangements. Variations in factors affecting the stability of water governance arrangements 
(physical environment and infrastructure, characteristics of agency, socio-political and 
regulatory trends and rules) ideally require adaptive mechanisms built in to the system. 
However, with regards to allocation, to ensure stakeholder priorities, reliability of supply and 
equity are met – this requires a degree of stability.  
We analysed co-governance, self-governance, polycentric, distributed, network, bottom-up, 
centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, top-down and market-centric modes of governance. 
Factors affecting their stability and how that can influence allocation decisions, along with 
their strengths, weaknesses and alignment with adaptive management theory were 
identified. Stability was most influenced by (1) physical environment and infrastructure, (2) 
characteristics of agency, (3) socio-political and regulatory trends and (4) rules, while 
dynamics stakeholder priorities, reliability of supply and equity affected allocation decision-
making. No matter the mode of governance, strengths and weaknesses were evident in each 
due to the instability of the operating conditions that the physical systems they govern are 
exposed to (climate, demand, competing uses etc.). One form of governance does not fit an 
exact context. Rather, water governance arrangements should be made fit for purpose. This 
is particularly important where resource availability is highly variable, and there is rapid 
change in the nature of demand (uses, qualities etc.). This means that, in the majority of 
cases, current governance arrangement require a degree of transformation in order to adapt. 
As such, we have identified a pattern of governance configurations during consecutive 
stages of the development of arrangements that may help water managers and regulators 
generate discussions in order to become better prepared to adapt and transform water 
governance arrangements. 
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